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CRITO’S FAILURE TO DELIBERATE SOCRATICALLY 
 
 In comparison to the speech of the Laws the dialectic between Crito and Socrates 
at the beginning of the Crito has received little attention. In this paper I argue that it 
contains an important philosophical message. It illustrates that the many’s failure to 
follow Socrates’ principles, like his principle of non-retaliation, is due to the intrinsic 
fragility of true beliefs. Though the many can understand Socrates’ values and may 
accept his principles if he argues with them long enough, they may fail to hold onto his 
principles when confronted with the difficulties of life. Crito’s failure to deliberate 
Socratically at the beginning of the Crito exemplifies the many’s predicament.  
 My interpretation challenges a recent interpretation of Crito’s dramatic persona in 
the Crito. According to it, Crito is a typical member of the many who is entrenched in 
their system of values and unable to transcend it. This interpretation is frequently coupled 
with the view that Crito is unphilosophical and has poor dialectical skills.1 The upshot is 
that Crito and the many are unable to understand Socrates’ values.2 
                                                 
1 For the thesis that Crito’s values prevent him from understanding Socrates see M. 
Miller, ‘“The Arguments I Seem to Hear”: Argument and Irony in the Crito’, Phronesis 
41 (1996), 121-37, R. Bentley, ‘Responding to Crito: Socrates and Political Obligation’, 
History of Political Thought 17 (1996), 1-20, and V. Harte, ‘Conflicting Values in Plato’s 
Crito’, Archiv für Geschicthe der Philosophie 81 (1999), 117-47. Scholars who support 
also the thesis that Crito has poor cognitive and dialectical skills include C. Young, 
‘Socrates and Obedience’, Phronesis 19 (1974), 1-29 and R. Weiss Socrates Dissatisfied: 
An Analysis of Plato’s Crito (Oxford, 1998). M. Lane (‘Agreement and Action in Plato’s 
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 My paper is divided into four sections. In the first section I explore the form of 
the dialectic between Crito and Socrates at the beginning of the Crito. In the second I 
challenge the interpretation that Crito is unable to understand Socrates’ values. In the 
third I argue that Socrates believes that Crito lost his originally held Socratic beliefs due 
to fear at the prospect of Socrates’ death. In the final section I relate this diagnosis of 
Crito’s condition to Socrates’ views about the intrinsic instability of beliefs and the 
power of appearance.3 
                                                                                                                                                 
Crito’, History of Political Thought 19 (1998), 313-30) claims that the text of the Crito 
leaves it open whether Crito’s failure to understand Socrates is ‘due to willful blindness 
or intellectual incapacity’ (at 315 with n.9). 
2 The view that Crito is unable to comprehend Socrates’ values is normally coupled with 
the interpretation that the speech of the Laws is un-Socratic (see, Miller, Harte, Young 
and Weiss in n.1). According to it, Socrates presents to Crito the speech of the Laws 
because Crito is unable to understand the real reasons behind Socrates’ decision to 
remain in prison. In this paper I do not directly address the question of whether the 
speech of the Laws is Socratic (I take on this task in [reference omitted for blind 
review]). My arguments, however, challenge the account of the dramatic development of 
the dialogue offered by supporters of the un-Socratic tenor of the speech of the Laws. 
For, as I argue, Crito is able to understand Socrates’ values and thus does not need to be 
presented with a second-best system of values. 
3 By ‘Socrates’ views’ I refer to the views of the Socratic character in Plato’s early 
dialogues. I focus primarily on the Protagoras and to a lesser extent on the Meno (for my 
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1. Locating the problem: The dialectic between Crito and Socrates 
 
 Crito urges Socrates to save himself (44b6-7). He argues that helping Socrates 
escape is just and courageous for Crito and Socrates’ friends. It is just because by helping 
Socrates escape they will avoid harming their public image. The many could not claim 
that they valued their money more than their friend (44b6-c5). And it is courageous 
because by disregarding the risks involved in getting Socrates out of prison they would 
not appear cowardly to the many (45d9-46a3). Crito also argues that it is just for Socrates 
to save himself. For by escaping he will frustrate the plans of his enemies (45c6-9). And 
he will fulfil his parental duties. He will continue raising and educating his children 
instead of letting chance determine their fate as happens with orphans (45c10-d3). 
Further, given that parental duties are burdensome Socrates’ refusal to fulfil them will 
count as an act of cowardice (45d4-9). 
 Socrates thinks that Crito’s deliberations rest on two mistaken theses. The first 
thesis (T1) is that one should take into account in one’s practical deliberations how the 
many morally evaluate one’s conduct (44d1-2). By contrast Socrates holds that (T1*) one 
should value the moral views of only the prudent and not the many (44c6-9). The second 
thesis concerns the power of the many to harm. Crito claims that the many can cause not 
the least but the greatest harm. As Socrates’ current predicament shows, the many have 
                                                                                                                                                 
use of evidence from the Meno see n.23). I do not assume that these views are necessarily 
the views of the historical Socrates.  
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the power to bring about someone’s death (44d2-5). So, Crito believes that (T2) death is 
the greatest harm. 
 Crito links T1 and T2. He claims that one should care about the moral views of 
the many (44d1-2) because they can cause the greatest harm, that is, death (44d3-5).4 
Socrates responds to T2 by claiming that the many do not have significant power because 
they cannot make anyone wise or foolish (44d6-10). His response shows that Socrates 
believes that (T2*) his current predicament for which the many are responsible, that is, 
his death, is not the greatest harm. 
 Crito deliberates about what he and Socrates should do based on theses which 
Socrates rejects. Socrates responds to Crito’s arguments in true elenctic fashion. He 
identifies two other theses which Crito explicitly holds and argues that they are 
inconsistent with T1 and T2. The first thesis (T3) is that in general one should value only 
some views, those of the wise (47a2-10). The second thesis (T4) is that one should 
primarily value living justly and not merely surviving (48b4-9). Socrates claims that 
these theses are parts of arguments (λόγους) he himself upheld (πρεσβεύω) and cherished 
(τιμῶ) in the past (46c1-2) and continuously advocated (see his use of ἐλέγετο at 46d1, 
                                                 
4 Crito qualifies his claim that the many can cause the greatest harm by adding ‘roughly 
speaking’ (σχεδόν) (Crito 44d4). The use of σχεδόν, however, does not indicate that Crito 
has any real reservations about whether death is the greatest harm. Crito has already 
described death as disaster (συμφορά) for everyone who is about to die (43c2). In any 
case, Socrates understands Crito to put forward the unqualified thesis that the many can 
cause the greatest harm (44d6-7) and Crito does not protest against this interpretation of 
his thesis. 
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d7 and 47a12). The idea conveyed by Socrates’ remarks is that Crito’s explicit approval 
of T3 (47a6) and T4 (48b6) is at least partly based on Socrates’ previous and repeated 
arguments in favour of them. So, Crito’s original theses (T1 and T2) are inconsistent with 
other theses (T3 and T4) he holds at least partly as a result of his participating in or 
witnessing previous Socratic elenchi.5 
 This is the problem I want to address: why does Crito base his original 
deliberations on T1 and T2 instead of the Socratic T1* and T2*? I single out three 
possible explanations. The first explanation is that T1* and T2* were never explicit to 
him. He either never inferred T1* and T2* from T3 and T4 respectively or never 
encountered any other arguments for T1* and T2*.  
 The second explanation is that, though T1* and T2* were explicit to Crito in the 
past, he never endorsed them or indeed the bulk of Socrates’ principles. Rather T1 and T2 
express the system of values which Crito endorses. His commitment to the Socratic 
principles T3 and T4 is superficial, reluctant or insincere.  
                                                 
5 It is not clear from the discussion between Socrates and Crito whether Crito came to 
hold (or confirm his commitment to) T3 and T4 partly as a result of being himself the 
subject of elenctic examinations by Socrates or simply witnessing elenctic examinations 
of others. This distinction, though interesting in its own right, is not important for my 
argument. 
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 The third explanation is that, though Crito encountered and accepted T1* and T2* 
in the past (as a result of participating in or witnessing previous elenchi), for some reason 
he recently lost his commitment to them and endorsed the views of the many.6 
 The first explanation may be quickly dismissed. Socrates produces a lengthy 
argument from 47a2 to 48a10 in which he infers T1* (one should value the moral views 
of only the prudent and not the many) from T3 (in general one should value only the 
views of the wise) and tries to support T2* (death is not the greatest harm). The main gist 
of the argument is that as in taking care of our body we heed the views of the gymnast or 
the doctor but not the many, in moral conduct which concerns our living well we should 
similarly heed the views of the moral expert and not the many. At 48b2-4 Socrates claims 
that this argument looks to him the same as before. He immediately signals that the 
argument is familiar from the past not only to him but also to Crito. He asks Crito 
whether the thesis that one should care not for mere survival but for living well, which is 
part of the general argument, ‘remains still with us’ (ἒτι μένει ἡμῑν) (48b4-5). Crito 
                                                 
6 A fourth explanation may be that Crito is in what E. Schwitzgebel, (‘In-between 
Believing’, Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001), 76-82) calls an ‘in-between state of 
belief’. The idea is roughly that Crito should not be considered to either fully believe or 
fully not believe T1, T2, T3 and T4. Rather he is in an intermediate state of believing 
with respect to these theses. I avoid exploring this fourth explanation as there is no 
evidence that Socrates recognizes such intermediate states of beliefs in the Crito or other 
early dialogues. As the analogy of Daedalus (see section 4 of this paper) indicates, 
Socrates prefers to speak in terms of acquisition and loss of flat-out beliefs rather than in 
terms of degrees of beliefs. 
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answers in the affirmative (48b6). Socrates also indicates that another premise of the 
argument in support of T2*, namely the equation of living justly with living well and 
rightly, is familiar to Crito from the past. He asks whether this thesis also remains with 
them (48b7-8) and Crito again agrees (48b9). 
 Do the other two explanations fare better? I will start by examining a variant of 
the second explanation which has recently gained currency. According to it, Crito never 
endorsed Socrates’ theses because he never understood Socrates’ system of values. His 
acceptance of T3 and T4 was superficial.  
 
2. Does Crito understand Socrates’ values? 
 
 What supports the claim that Crito fails to understand Socrates’ system of values? 
Young argues that ‘there is an abyss between Crito’s opinions and those of 
Socrates….Crito is…one of the many, and …therefore he will not be able to understand, 
or at least to understand properly and fully, the Socratic principles’.7 This suggests the 
following explanation (E1) of Crito’s failure to understand Socrates’ values:  
 
E1: Crito’s moral framework prevents him from understanding Socrates’ values. 8  
                                                 
7 Young (n.1) at 6.  
8 Apart from Young (see n.7) Bentley (n.1 at 8 and 17), Harte (n.1 130-4) and Weiss (n.1 
at 80) also support E1. Miller is not explicit about what prevents Crito from following 
Socrates’ line of reasoning. But his claim that ‘it is precisely the perspective of the 
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Some scholars believe that Crito’s understanding of Socrates’ values is also 
impeded by his poor cognitive and reasoning capacities. For example, Weiss speaks of 
Crito’s general ‘unphilosophical nature’ and Young of his poor dialectical skills.9 We 
have thus a second explanation of Crito’s failure to understand Socrates’ values: 
 
E2: Crito’s poor cognitive and reasoning abilities prevent him from understanding Socrates’ values. 
 
 I will start by assessing whether Crito is described in the dialogue as having poor 
cognitive and reasoning abilities. I will use as a standard the cognitive and reasoning 
abilities one could reasonably expect a typical member of the many to have. 
 Plato’s portrait of Crito in the Crito does not provide grounds for thinking that 
Crito lacks such ordinary cognitive and reasoning abilities.10 First, Crito’s arguments, 
though not Socratic, are coherent and reasonable, at least from the point of the many’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
many…that rules in [Crito]’ (Miller (n.1) at 134) suggests that he thinks it is Crito’s 
moral framework. 
9 Weiss (n.1) 43-9; Young (n.1) at 12. Lane ((n.1) at 135) speaks of Crito’s ‘obduracy’. 
10 I focus exclusively on the dramatic persona of Crito in the Crito. For an account of 
Crito’s dramatic persona in other dialogues see M. Stokes, Dialectic in Action: An 
Examination of Plato’s Crito (Swansea, 2005), 29-32. Stokes shows that Crito is not 
depicted as a fool or stupid in either the Phaedo or the Euthydemus. I am in substantial 
agreement with Stokes’ remark that “‘un-Socratic” and “intelligent”, even in Plato’s eyes, 
need not be mutually contradictory epithets’ (at 32). 
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moral framework. There seem to be no logical gaps in his inference from T1 and T2 to 
the conclusion that Socrates should escape. His description of the plan to bribe officials 
and help Socrates’ escape to Thessaly (Crito 45a6-c5), though sketchy, does not seem 
absurd. His account of the harm Socrates’ children will suffer is reasonable and at least 
prima facie relevant to the discussion (45c10-d7). His claims that by dying Socrates will 
serve his enemies’ aims (45c6-9) and harm the public image of his friends (45d9-46a4) 
raise reasonable concerns at least from the point of view of the many. 
 Second, the fact that Crito fails to take on board Socrates’ ‘philosophical’ 
conception of harm as harm to the soul and continues to think in terms of physical harm 
or harm to the body11 should not count as evidence that he has poor reasoning and 
cognitive abilities. Socrates presents to him his conception of harm to the soul in the 
context of his lengthy argument in support of T1* and T2* (47a2-48a10). Socrates, 
however, does not explain the relation between harm to the soul and physical harm. It is 
unclear (a) whether he (or for this purpose, Plato, the author of the dialogue) understands 
that there is a tension between the two conceptions of harm or (b) if he does, how he 
resolves it.12 This unclarity does not allow us to draw any conclusions about Crito’s 
ability to understand the conception of harm to the soul. 
                                                 
11 See Weiss in n. 1 64-5 and 82-3. My arguments in the main text also tell against 
Harte’s claim (n.1 at 132) that Crito and Socrates have fundamentally different 
understandings of harm. 
12 The tension between these two conceptions of harm and justice maps the tension 
between ordinary and psychic justice in the Republic.  
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 Furthermore, the course of the discussion between Socrates and Crito does not 
require that the latter employs Socrates’ conception of harm to the soul. After arguing for 
T1* and T2*, Socrates himself ceases to employ the conception of harm to the soul. He 
turns to the principle that one should never commit injustice (49a4-5) and relies 
exclusively on the conception of physical harm. For example, when he equates 
committing injustice (ἀδικεῑν) with ill-treating others (κακουργεῑν) (49c2-9),13 he has in 
mind ill-treatment in the ordinary (and Crito’s) sense of physically harming others and 
not in the sense of harming one’s soul.  
 One could object that the real point of this principle is that one should never harm 
one’s own soul. But this will not do. Consider another Socratic principle, the principle of 
non-retaliation (49b9-c1 and c4-6), which Socrates’ ban on all injustice grounds. One 
cannot make sense of the principle that one should never return injustice unless injustice 
involves physically harming others, namely, those who originally physically harmed the 
agent. If the conception of harm to the soul were used, the principle would be 
inapplicable to paradigmatic cases of retaliation. It would only rule out trying to harm the 
souls of those who harmed one’s soul.  
 Third, one should not overstate the implications of Crito’s admission at 50a4-5 
that he does not understand the point of a relevant Socratic question. Socrates gains 
Crito’s agreement that one should do the just things one has agreed to do (49e5-8). Then 
he asks Crito whether by escaping without persuading the city they will be ill-treating 
                                                 
13 The controversy over whether κακουργεῑν means here mere harm as opposed to 
wrongful harm is irrelevant to my argument. For different views compare Harte (n.1) 
with C. Kahn, ‘Problems in the Argument of the Crito’, Apeiron 22 (1989), 29-43.  
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some people and in fact those one should least ill-treat and whether they will in so doing 
be remaining faithful to their just agreements (49e9-50a3). Crito’s puzzlement is totally 
justified. Socrates has not indicated whom one should least ill-treat. He has not explained 
why the point of persuading the city is relevant. And he has not specified what the 
relevant just agreements are. Crito has every reason to be unclear about what Socrates has 
in mind.14 Socrates immediately proceeds to elucidate the content of his question by the 
imaginary speech of the Laws. 
 Thus, Crito is not presented in the Crito as a person with atypically poor cognitive 
and reasoning abilities, that is, as falling short of the standards of cognitive and reasoning 
abilities one would reasonably expect the many to have. It may be argued, however, that 
in order for one to understand Socrates’ system of values one needs cognitive and 
                                                 
14 Lane ((n.1) at 322) claims that Crito fails to grasp the minor premise of Socrates’ 
practical deliberation the conclusion of which is that Socrates should not escape. 
According to Lane the major premise is the agreed principle that one should never do 
injustice and the minor premise is that to escape is to do injustice because it is harmful. 
The minor premise, however, follows from Socrates’ equation of ἀδικεῑν with 
κακουργεῑν at 49b4-c9, only if we assume that for Socrates escaping from prison would 
be an act of κακουργεῑν. But Socrates has not argued for this point yet. The relevant 
justification is provided in the speech of the Laws. (Weiss (n.1 at 79) also claims that 
Crito fails to grasp an argument against escape Socrates has already established. For, in 
my view, conclusive criticisms of Weiss’s interpretation see L. Brown, ‘Did Socrates 
agree to obey the Laws?’ in L. Judson and V. Karasmanis (edd) Remembering Socrates 
(Oxford, 2006), 72-87 at 76-7 and Stokes in n. 10, 201-9.)  
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reasoning abilities higher than those possessed by a typical member of the many. In the 
Crito Socrates expresses his pessimism about the possibility that the many may change 
their moral outlook. He claims to know that very few will ever agree with his view that 
one should never return injustice (49d2). Is Socrates’ pessimism founded on his belief 
that the many lack the intellectual ability to understand his values? 
 In the Republic Plato is explicit that it is impossible for the many to become 
philosophers (494a4). He believes that only few have the natural abilities for reaching 
philosophical truths (491a7-b3) which include truths about moral values. On the one 
hand, however, we do not find any explicit remarks about the many’s natural abilities in 
either the Crito or other early dialogues. So, it is prudent not to rush into reading this 
doctrine of the Republic about the natural abilities of the many into the Crito. On the 
other, philosophy is regarded in the Republic as a high-level intellectual discipline which 
presupposes training in high-level specialised studies like mathematics. But, first, 
Socrates does not associate moral reasoning in the Crito or any other early dialogue with 
training in high-level specialised disciplines. And, second, the question at issue concerns 
the many’s ability to understand Socrates’ values. It is true that in the early dialogues 
Socrates stresses the importance of definitions for moral knowledge. Even if grasping 
moral definitions is considered a high-level intellectual enterprise, it is clear from 
Socrates’ repeated disavowals of knowledge15 that he lacks this high-level moral 
knowledge. So, it is questionable whether we can rely on the doctrine of the Republic 
about the many’s natural abilities to explain Socrates’ pessimism. 
                                                 
15 I side with the interpretation that Socrates’ disavowals of knowledge are genuine. For a 
defence see T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 27-9. 
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 Is Socrates’ pessimism based on his belief that the many’s moral framework 
prevents them from understanding Socrates’ values? This prompts examination of E1. 
The supporters of E1 do not clarify how Crito’s moral framework is supposed to prevent 
him from understanding Socrates’. One possibility should be ruled out on the basis of my 
argument in the previous paragraph. We should not think that Socrates’ moral framework 
includes pieces of high-level moral knowledge or specialised high-level non-moral 
knowledge inaccessible to the many.  
 Perhaps, however, the idea is not that Crito cannot comprehend Socrates’ values 
due to lack of an appropriate conceptual apparatus. Rather since Crito is entrenched in the 
moral values of the many, he cannot really see the point of Socrates’ values. He cannot 
conceive the form of life they suggest as a meaningful form of life for him.  
 There is in ancient philosophy a train of thought which supports the idea that 
some people may fail to see the point of other people’s values. Those who follow this 
train of thought stress the importance of one’s being habituated to virtuous conduct or 
receiving appropriate moral education from early childhood. For example, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle denies that arguments alone can make men good. It is 
almost impossible that they remove character traits long developed by habit. Moral 
arguments are useful only to those who have already been appropriately habituated to 
virtuous conduct (1179b4-31).16 
                                                 
16 For an analysis of Aristotle’s argument see M. Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to Be 
Good’ in A. O. Rorty (ed.) Essays on Aristotle (Berkeley, 1980), 69-92. 
. 
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 Similarly, Plato recognizes the importance of one’s receiving appropriate moral 
education from early childhood in the context of his discussion of the educational power 
of poetry and music in books 2 and 3 of the Republic. It would be a mistake, however, to 
project back to the early dialogues the idea that only those who are properly morally 
trained from early childhood can access the true moral values. It conflicts with Socrates’ 
confidence in the Apology that he would convince the jurors of the truth of one of his 
most paradoxical theses, namely, that no one willingly commits wrong, were he allowed 
more time to talk to them (37a6-b1). Socrates does not assume that his fellow Athenians 
are properly trained in virtue. He explicitly asserts that the many do not properly educate 
their children (24e1-25c4). So, Socrates believes that his fellow Athenians even though 
they have not been properly educated in virtue are able to understand and potentially be 
convinced about the truth of his values. 
 This is further corroborated by a comment Socrates makes in response to 
Callicles’ claim in the Gorgias that like the many he is not convinced by Socrates’ 
arguments (513c3-6). Callicles is hardly someone who has received proper training in 
virtue according to Socrates’ standards. But Socrates remains confident that he would 
convince him if he engaged in many discussions with him (513c7-d1).  
 Finally, the text from the Crito which is adduced to support the thesis that Crito’s 
moral framework prevents him for understanding Socrates’ values17 fails to establish as 
much. Socrates claims: 
 
                                                 
17 Bentley (n.1) at 8 and 16-7, Miller (n.1) at 125, Weiss (n.1) 62-3 and Harte (n.1) at 
130. 
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So one should never return injustice nor ill-treat any human being no matter what they suffer from them. 
And be careful, Crito, that in agreeing to these you are not agreeing to anything which goes against your 
own beliefs. For I know that few do believe or will believe these things. And there is no common counsel 
(κοινὴ βουλή) between those who believe these things and those who don’t, but it is necessary that they 
show contempt for each other when they encounter each other’s deliberations. (Crito 49c10-d5) 
 
 Vlastos rightly remarks that Socrates does not deny that he can argue with the 
many. His point concerns only practical deliberation. As Vlastos puts it, ‘the gulf created 
by this disagreement will be unbridgeable when it comes to deciding what is to be 
done’.18 
 So Socrates believes that if two persons hold opposing principles of action they 
cannot agree about how to act. Since Socrates claims that they will show contempt for 
each other’, we can reasonably assume that he means that the first person cannot see the 
point of the action the second person proposes and vice versa. The scope of this 
unbridgeable disagreement is narrow. It concerns the course of action to be taken. The 
disagreement is also conditional. It is conditional on the persistence of their disagreement 
about their principles. But the thesis that Crito’s moral framework prevents him from 
understanding Socrates’ values implies something stronger. It implies that if two persons 
held opposing principles of action neither of them could see the point of the opposing 
principle. The explanation is that the overall moral framework of the first person, say, the 
cluster of moral principles and attitudes he holds as a result of his education, prevents 
him from seeing the point of the principle the second person holds and vice versa. Thus, 
                                                 
18 G.Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge, 1991) at 195 (my 
emphasis). Weiss (n.1) at 62 and Harte (n.1) at 130 agree with Vlastos’s interpretation.  
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these two persons cannot resolve their disagreement about these principles. The scope of 
the allegedly unbridgeable disagreement is wide. It concerns the opposing principles 
themselves. Can we infer from the fact that two persons are unable to resolve their 
narrow disagreement about the course of action to be taken because they share different 
principles that they are equally unable to resolve their (wide) disagreement about these 
principles? The answer is no. Nothing precludes that they may, through considering, for 
example, some further principles, agree that only one of the opposing principles is 
correct. 
 So the passage of the Crito under consideration establishes a principle weaker 
than the principle required by the thesis that Crito’s moral framework prevents him from 
understanding Socrates’ values. It shows only that Socrates believes that for as long as 
two persons have opposing principles of action neither of them can see the point of acting 
in the way the opposing principle recommends. But it does not show they are unable to 
resolve their disagreement about their principles of action (by, say, one of them changing 
his view about his principle of action).19 
 Why, then, does Socrates claim that the many will never believe that one should 
never retaliate? The claim is ambiguous. Socrates may be referring to the acquisition of a 
                                                 
19 In fact the elenchus is based on the assumption that this wide agreement is possible. If 
someone disagrees with Socrates’ principles Socrates could gain his agreement on some 
other principles and through them get him to revise his commitment to his original un-
Socratic principles. This is precisely what Socrates does in the Crito when he gains 
Crito’s agreement on T3 and T4 and makes Crito reconsider his commitment to T1 and 
T2. 
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relevant belief by the many. In this case he claims that the many will never come to 
believe his thesis. Alternatively he may be referring to the tenacity of their belief.20 That 
is, he claims that even if they come to believe his thesis they may not retain it. I will 
focus on Socrates’ views about the tenacity of the true beliefs of the many in section 4. 
For now it suffices to note that if we take Socrates to be referring to the many’s coming 
to believe his thesis, we may construct an initial explanation of Socrates’ pessimism on 
the basis of the evidence of the Apology and the Gorgias. Socrates believes that the many 
will never come to believe his thesis because he did not have enough time to engage in 
repeated arguments with a great number of people about the justification of retaliation 
(and obviously his death will prevent him from engaging in such arguments in the 
future).  
 To sum up. I argued that Crito has the reasoning and cognitive abilities one 
should expect a typical member of the many to have. Further I argued that we have no 
strong reasons to think that Socrates believes that Crito’s moral framework prevents him 
from understanding Socrates’. I suggest we treat with scepticism the interpretation that 
Crito’s fails to understand Socrates’ values and for this reason fails to deliberate 
Socratically.  
 There remains another possibility. Although Crito may have understood Socrates’ 
principles, he was nevertheless never convinced by them. Perhaps Socrates did not argue 
enough with him. All his avowals of Socrates’ principles, that is, both those made in the 
course of the discussion with Socrates in the Crito and their previous similar agreements 
                                                 
20 On this reading δοκεῑ and δόξει at 49d2 refer to the disposition of believing that one 
should never retaliate as opposed to the acquisition of the relevant belief. 
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Socrates repeatedly refers to have been insincere or at best reluctant. We may treat this 
possibility as another variant of the interpretation that Crito did not deliberate 
Socratically because he never endorsed Socrates’ values. It gains plausibility from 
Socrates’ claim that he does not want to convince Crito against his will (ἂκοντος) (48e3-
5). And it is further corroborated by the claim Socrates makes at 49d1-2 that he does not 
want Crito to agree with him against his belief (παρὰ δόξαν). These Socratic remarks 
could be plausibly understood as exhibiting concern about the sincerity of Crito’s 
agreement with Socrates. 
 I will return to this possibility after exploring the third explanation of why Crito 
did not deliberate Socratically I distinguished in the first section of my paper. According 
to it, though Crito endorsed in the past (as a result of participating in or witnessing 
Socratic elenchi) Socrates’ theses about the value of the views of the many and the 
importance of death, he recently lost his commitment to them.  
 
3. Socrates’ diagnosis of Crito’s predicament-Crito’s fear 
 
 I will begin by looking closely at how Socrates reacts to Crito’s un-Socratic 
deliberations. Immediately after Crito’s exhortation to escape Socrates responds that he 
will obey only the rational argument (λόγῳ) which seems best to him. This is what he has 
been doing throughout his life (46b4-6). He adds that he is not able to (οὐ δύναμαι) throw 
out (ἐκβαλλεῑν) the rational arguments (λόγους) he previously accepted in the face of his 
current misfortune (τύχη) (46b6-8). The reason is that these rational arguments continue 
to look to him very much the same (σχεδόντιὅμοιοι); so he upholds and respects them as 
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before (46b8-c2). If he and Crito fail to find better rational arguments which apply to the 
current situation, he will definitely (εὖ ἲσθι ὅτι) refuse to follow Crito’s suggestion (46c2-
3). He would not change his mind even if the many were to try to scare them like children 
with more evils than they currently do, that is, by threatening them with imprisonments, 
deaths and confiscation of wealth (46c3-6). He makes a similar point in his discussion of 
the principle that one should never commit injustice. He suggests that their previously 
agreed theses should not be thrown out (ἐκκεχυμέναι) in a period of a few days (in which 
they are faced with their current misfortune) (49a7-9). If they did so, they would behave 
no differently from children despite their being of an advanced age (49a9-b1). 
Irrespective of whether the many threaten them with even more evils than they currently 
do, they should not change their minds about the principle that it is altogether bad and 
shameful to commit injustice (49b1-5). So, Socrates remains committed to his originally 
held beliefs and will not revise them in the face of his imminent death. He implies that 
Crito should do the same. 
 Furthermore, Socrates’ overall emotional condition is not in the least affected by 
the prospect of his death. When Crito enters his cell he finds Socrates peacefully asleep 
(43a9-b5). Socrates makes the rather humorous comment that men of his age should not 
be afraid of death (43b10-11). And when he hears the bad news that the ship from Delos 
is arriving he shows no anxiety but is ready to accept his fate (43d7-8).  
 What about Crito? Socrates claims that since Crito is not going to die tomorrow 
the current predicament would not make him lose his correct judgement (παρακρούει) 
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(46e3-47a2). The irony of Socrates’ claim is striking.21 On the one hand, Crito’s 
judgement has already been adversely affected. Crito has already produced arguments 
based on the alleged importance of the views of the many and the significance of mere 
survival. On the other, Crito is actually overwhelmed by fear and anxiety. He manifests 
his anxiety in various ways. He declares it at the opening scene when he contrasts 
Socrates’ ability to enjoy a peaceful sleep with his own sleeplessness (ἀγρυπνία) and 
distressfulness (λύπη) (43b3-5). He also claims that the news of the arrival of the ship 
from Delos is bad and heavy to bear for himself and the companions of Socrates (though 
as Crito observes not for Socrates himself) (43c5-8). He employs vocabulary with strong 
emotional overtones. He introduces the term ‘disaster’ (συμφορά) to describe the 
prospect of Socrates’ death (43b8-9 and c2). He also uses the same term to describe what 
will happen to him if Socrates dies (44b8). His anxiety is also evinced in the way in 
which he presents his arguments in order to convince Socrates to escape. He is so anxious 
to convince Socrates that his impatience gets the best of him. He urges Socrates to be 
convinced and not to act otherwise (45a3 and 46a8-9) and not to give a lot of thought to 
the issue because there is little time (46a4-5). 
                                                 
21 Though the comment is ‘ironic’ in the sense that Socrates means the opposite of what 
he says, the aim of Socrates is not to ridicule or mock Crito. Rather his aim is 
educational: he wants to make Crito realize that his anxiety affects his reasoning. Once 
Crito becomes aware of this fact he will be more readily benefited by an elenctic 
discussion. For an illuminating discussion of the nature and scope of Socratic irony to 
which I am indebted see, M. Lane, ‘Reconsidering Socratic Irony’ in D. Morrison (ed.) 
The Cambridge Companion to Socrates (Cambridge forthcoming). 
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 I suggest that the conclusion to draw from Socrates’ ironic claim at 46e3-47a2 is 
that Socrates believes that Crito deliberated un-Socratically at the beginning of the 
dialogue because of his fear at the prospect of Socrates’ imminent death. Crito fears that 
Socrates’ death is the worst thing both for him and for Socrates. Because of his fear Crito 
loses his commitment to T1* (one should value the moral views of only the wise) and 
T2* (death is not the greatest harm), starts valuing the views of the many and thinks that 
mere survival is of paramount importance. 
 This interpretation is corroborated by two additional considerations. First, it is 
supported by the form of Socrates’ repeated questions about whether Crito stands by 
previously discussed theses (see 48b2-5, 48b7-8 and 49e2-3). Socrates formulates his 
questions using the verbs μένειν and ἐμμένειν. This indicates that he is concerned with 
the stability of Crito’s beliefs.22 Secondly, this interpretation captures the main point of 
the contrast between Socrates and Crito. As we have seen, Socrates claims that he is 
unable to throw out (ἐκβαλλεῖν) the rational arguments he originally held in the face of a 
misfortune (46b6-9). But on the interpretation I am advancing this is exactly what Crito 
does. He is throwing out his originally held beliefs in the face of Socrates’ imminent 
death. 
                                                 
22 Socrates consistently uses μένειν and ἐμμένειν to refer to the stability of beliefs. μένειν 
is used at Euthyphro 11b8, c4, c6, c9 and d8, Euthydemus 288a3, Gorgias 480b3 and 
Meno 83d3 (cf. μένουσαν at Protagoras 356e2). ἐμμένειν is used at Protagoras 353b3. In 
the context of the analogy of Daedalus in the Meno παραμένεινis used possibly because 
of the contrast with δραπετεύειν, see Meno 97d10, e4 and 98a2. For more on the analogy 
of Daedalus see section 4 of this paper. 
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 Crito’s fear does not bring him to a state in which he is unable to argue. As I have 
explained, he can construct coherent (though not Socratic) arguments in favour of 
Socrates’ escaping from prison. Furthermore, Socrates himself seems to believe that Crito 
can be alerted to his predicament and through arguments restore his originally held true 
beliefs. On the one hand, Socrates signals to Crito that his mindset is influenced by his 
fear. For example, he refers to the grotesqueness of being scared by the power of the 
many like children at 46c3-6. And he makes the ironic comment at 46e3-47a2 that Crito 
must be clear-headed given that he is not the one who will die the following day. On the 
other, he engages in a dialogue with him. The dialogue consists in reiteration of 
principles established in previous elenchi and some arguments which support or clarify 
these principles. Socrates reiterates the thesis that one should value only some moral 
views, those of the wise, and not all views (47a2-11). He then supports and clarifies this 
thesis with an argument about the benefits of following the views of the wise at 47a12-
48a10. He also reminds to Crito the thesis that one should care most about living well and 
not merely surviving and that living well is equivalent to living justly (48b2-9). 
 There remains the possibility that after Socrates tries to refute the false 
assumptions of Crito’s arguments and restore his commitment to the relevant Socratic 
principles he realizes that Crito is unable to follow the path of reason. The form of the 
subsequent discussion between Socrates and Crito does not give credence to this 
interpretation. Socrates presents to Crito the principle which should guide their 
deliberation about whether Socrates should escape. It is the principle that one should 
under no circumstances do wrong (49a4-7) even in retaliating for a wrong received 
(49b9-10). This principle is presented as a genuine Socratic principle which has been 
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agreed in many previous discussions with Crito (49a6-7). Socrates later elucidates that 
this principle should be treated as equivalent to the principle that one should never ill-
treat people even in retaliation for previous ill-treatment (49c2-11). 
 Thus, even after Socrates tries to refute the false assumptions upon which Crito 
bases his arguments (47a2-48b9), he continues to present to Crito genuine Socratic 
principles. Furthermore he does not exhibit any concerns about whether Crito 
comprehends these principles. Rather his worry continues to be whether Crito’s 
commitment to these principles is stable. He asks Crito whether their previous consensus 
that one should never commit injustice holds or has been thrown out (ἐκκεχυμέναι) due to 
the recent event of Socrates’ imprisonment (49a5-9). And he similarly asks Crito whether 
he remains stable in his belief that one should never do injustice or ill-treat people, even 
when one has been wronged (49d5-e3). In both cases Crito reaffirms his commitment to 
his originally held beliefs (49b6 and 49e4). 
 Socrates continues to be preoccupied with the issue of the stability of one’s 
commitments in the speech of the Laws. One of the central questions he presents the 
Laws as asking is whether by escaping Socrates would reverse his commitment to 
previous just agreements with the Laws. The point the Laws are making is that Socrates 
agreed to obey the Laws and more specifically the law which commands that the 
decisions of the courts have authority (50c5-7, 53a6; cf. 50a2-3). In the relevant passages 
the verb ἐμμένειν is used. An implicit parallel is drawn between, on the one hand, 
Socrates’ imaginary loss of commitment to his previous just agreements with the Laws 
and, on the other, Crito’s actual and Socrates’ imaginary loss of commitment to their own 
previous agreements. Socrates claimed that if in the face of Socrates’ current predicament 
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Crito and Socrates backed down from their previously agreed principles they would look 
like children despite being of advanced age (49a7-b1). The Laws claim that if Socrates 
retracted his lifelong agreements with them he would look ridiculous (53a7-8). 
 It may be objected that in the speech of the Laws Socrates is concerned not with 
the issue of the stability of one’s beliefs but with the issue of the stability of one’s 
intentions. What the Laws accuse Socrates of is failing to stick to his intention to obey 
the Laws which he expressed in deeds by choosing to remain in Athens (52d4-6). But one 
should not overstate the distinction between stability of beliefs and stability of intentions 
in this context. First, in the imaginary scenario of Socrates’ escape, the reversal of 
Socrates’ intention to obey the Laws would be due to the fact that some of his beliefs 
changed. These would be beliefs about the legitimacy of his retaliating against the Laws 
because the court did not judge his case correctly (50c1-4). So, Socrates would form the 
intention to disobey the Laws because he would have changed his commitment to the 
belief that retaliation is always wrong or his commitment to the belief that one should 
never do wrong (49b2-c11). Second, Crito’s unstable beliefs Socrates focuses upon at the 
beginning of the Crito are not theoretical beliefs concerning, for example, mathematical 
or scientific truths. They are beliefs about the value of the views of the many and the 
importance of mere survival which guide Crito’s practical deliberations. So, they are 
beliefs which are intrinsically linked with the formation of Crito’s relevant intentions.  
 Furthermore, the Laws do not accuse Socrates of being insincere in making his 
agreements with them. They do not doubt that Socrates intended to obey them when he 
agreed to obey them by deciding to remain in Athens. Their point is that if Socrates 
escaped he would be inconsistent with agreements he genuinely intended to honor at the 
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time of making them. They claim that he was satisfied with Athens and its laws 
exceedingly more than his fellow-citizens (53a3-5). On the imaginary scenario of 
Socrates’ escape Socrates would have changed his attitude towards Athens and its laws 
after his trial and the decision of the court. 
 This last consideration paves the way for explaining Socrates’ concern about the 
sincerity of Crito’s agreements with Socrates at 48e3-5 and 49d1-2. Socrates does not 
believe that Crito’s avowals of Socrates’ principles have always been insincere or 
reluctant. At both 48e3-5 and 49d1-2 Socrates worries about the sincerity of Crito’s 
avowal of the principle that one should never do wrong. But it is clear that Socrates’ 
worry has restricted scope. Socrates worries about Crito’s avowal in the context of their 
current discussion and not about Crito’s previous avowals of the same principle. Shortly 
after his remark that he does not want to convince Crito against his will, Socrates invites 
Crito to consider ‘whether all those previous agreements have been thrown out in the 
course of these few days (ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις) [presumably the days of Socrates’ trial and 
imprisonment]’ (49a7-9). ‘These few days’ are contrasted with the ‘many times’ 
(πολλάκις) in which Crito and Socrates have agreed on the principle that one should 
never do wrong (49a6-7). The idea conveyed is that Socrates worries about whether Crito 
has changed his mind about this principle in the last few days in the face of Socrates’ 
predicament. The text does not suggest that Socrates doubts the sincerity of Crito’s many 
previous agreements. 
 Socrates’ worry is understandable on the interpretation I advance. Socrates knows 
that Crito lost his commitment to some other Socratic principles he previously held 
 26 
because of his fear at the prospect of Socrates’ imminent death. He wants to make certain 
that Crito’s fear has not shaken Crito’s confidence in other Socratic principles as well. 
 To sum up, Socrates believes not that Crito is unable to understand Socrates’ 
values but rather that Crito has unstable beliefs. His fear at the prospect of Socrates’ 
death causes him to lose his originally held true beliefs and start deliberating on the basis 
of false beliefs about the value of the view of the many and the significance of mere 
survival. 
 
4. Socrates on the instability of true beliefs and the power of appearance 
 
 On my proposed interpretation Socrates assumes in the Crito that (a) true beliefs 
may be lost (b) due to certain psychological conditions of the agent (like fear). Evidence 
from the Protagoras, the Euthyphro and the Meno suggests that (a) is a basic Socratic 
thesis. Socrates’ views about the power of appearance in the Protagoras also elucidate 
how (b) is possible, namely how one’s psychological condition may make one lose one’s 
true beliefs.  
 In the Protagoras Socrates implies that true beliefs may be lost. At 356d7-e2, a 
passage to which I will return shortly, he claims that possession of the art of measurement 
of pleasures and pains enables one’s soul to remain hold of the truth (μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ 
ἀληθεῖ). Thus he implies that if one lacks this art of measurement one may lose one’s true 
beliefs. Socrates illustrates the intrinsic instability of beliefs by analogy with Daedalus’ 
statues, which do not stay firm but fly away (Euthyphro 11b6-d6). The point of the 
comparison is to illustrate that the elenchus can remove false beliefs. In the Meno 
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Socrates uses the analogy of Daedalus to illustrate that true beliefs may be lost (in 
accordance with what is implied in the Protagoras). He recognizes that true beliefs (as 
opposed to knowledge) are intrinsically unstable. Like Daedalus’ statues, they never 
remain stable but escape from the soul, unless they are tied down. What ties them down 
and makes them stable is explanatory reasoning provided by knowledge (97d6-98a8).23  
 Crito’s true beliefs behave like Daedalus’ statues. Crito does not possess 
knowledge about how one should live one’s life. So, he cannot tie down the true beliefs 
which he gained as a result of his discussions with Socrates. Some of his previously held 
true beliefs about the value of the moral views of the many and the comparative 
unimportance of mere survival depart from his soul and fail to guide his deliberations. 
 What triggered the departure of these true beliefs from Crito’s soul? On my 
interpretation it was Crito’s fear. The Protagoras provides a model for understanding 
both what Crito’s fear consists in and how it can cause the loss of Crito’s true beliefs. In 
the Protagoras Socrates contrasts the art of measurement of pleasures and pains upon 
which the salvation of our lives depends with the power of appearance (356c8-357c1). 
The person who possesses the art of measurement of pleasures and pains can correctly 
calculate their intensity and spatial or temporal proximity and make informed choices. As 
                                                 
23 Despite the fact that the Meno contains ‘Platonic’ doctrines like the theory of 
recollection, two considerations which I have already mentioned suggest that the analogy 
of Daedalus is primarily ‘Socratic’ in spirit. First, in the Euthyphro Socrates compares 
beliefs to the statues of Daedalus. Second, in the Protagoras Socrates implicitly assumes 
what the analogy of Daedalus illustrates in the Meno, namely, that true beliefs are 
unstable.  
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a result he is not deceived by the power of appearance but helps his soul retain its true 
beliefs (τὴν ψυχὴ μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ) (356d7-e2). Socrates equates pleasure and 
pain with goodness and badness respectively in the Protagoras. Whether Socrates 
sincerely espouses hedonism is controversial.24 For my argument it suffices that he 
recognizes that there is an art of measurement of harms and benefits (irrespective of 
whether the latter are analysed in terms of pain and pleasure) which enables the agent to 
reach correct decisions about how he should act. The person who lacks this art of 
measurement can be deceived by the apparent magnitude of certain harms and benefits 
and miscalculate their significance. 
 We may consider Crito to be a victim of the power of appearance on the basis of 
the model of the Protagoras. Crito compares the harms and benefits resulting from 
Socrates’ death with the harms and benefits resulting from Socrates’ escape from prison. 
He becomes overwhelmed by the apparent magnitude of the harms resulting from 
Socrates’ death presumably because of their temporal proximity.25 For example, the 
contempt which he believes his fellow Athenians will show to him because he did not try 
to save his friend appears to him exceedingly harmful. And perhaps the same is true of 
                                                 
24 For opposing interpretations see, C. C.W. Taylor, Plato Protagoras (Oxford, 1991), 
164-70 and D. Zeyl, ‘Socrates and Hedonism: Protagoras 351B-358D’, Phronesis 25 
(1980), 250-69. 
25 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the question of why some things have 
the power of appearance. For an original answer to this question and review of the 
relevant literature see T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology 
(Cambridge, 2010), 70-88. 
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the satisfaction of Socrates’ enemies with their achievement of destroying him. These 
appearances lead him to expect that exceedingly bad things will happen to him and 
Socrates if Socrates dies. In the Protagoras Socrates defines fear as expectation of evil 
(358d5-e2). So, we can say that these appearances generate fear in Crito’s soul.26 His 
fear, that is, his expectation that exceedingly bad things will happen to him and Socrates 
if Socrates dies, loosens his commitment to T1* (one should value the moral views of 
only the prudent and not the many) and T2* (death is not the greatest harm). He now 
comes to believe T1 (one should value the moral views of the many) and T2 (death is the 
greatest harm) and base on them his deliberations about what Socrates should do. 
 So, the Protagoras model of the instability of true beliefs helps us get a more 
complete account of Crito’s failure to deliberate Socratically. As Socrates indicates in the 
Crito, Crito’s loss of his originally held true beliefs is due to fear. On the basis of the 
Protagoras fear may be understood as the proximate cause of the loss of Crito’s true 
beliefs. Its ultimate cause is Crito’s lack of the art of measurement and his related 
vulnerability to the power of appearance.  
 We may ponder on Socrates’ understanding of the instability of beliefs and the 
power of appearance to further sharpen the contrast between Crito and Socrates. If we 
take Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge at face value, then Socrates (like Crito) has not 
tied down his true beliefs with explanatory reasoning and does not possess the art of 
measurement. Nevertheless, even at the prospect of his death his true beliefs do not 
escape from his soul but guide his deliberations. I do not have the space here to provide a 
                                                 
26 Crito’s sleeplessness and distress may be considered to be somatic and emotional 
manifestations of his fear. 
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full explication of the tenacity of Socrates’ true beliefs. I will only outline how Socrates 
resists the power of appearance in order to elucidate the contrast with Crito. 
 Socrates knows that his true beliefs are not intrinsically stable. He is also aware of 
the power of appearance and his lack of the art of measurement. Furthermore, he holds 
with confidence certain beliefs (about the value of death, the power of the many, the 
justness of retaliation and the imprudence of injustice) which he has examined repeatedly 
using the elenchus. I suggest that for these reasons he (a) distrusts any unreflective 
judgements (of others or even his own) which are based on unexamined appearances and 
(b) gives precedence to his reflective, elenctically examined beliefs. During a life devoted 
to arguments he has developed the epistemic virtue of having his reflective judgements 
trump his unreflective ones. This is the gist of his claim that he has always (ἀεὶ) obeyed 
the argument (λόγῳ) which seemed best to his reasoning and that in the face of his death 
he is unable to throw out his elenctically examined beliefs but continues to respect and 
value them (Crito 46b4-c2). Since he believes that his fellow citizens similarly lack the 
art of measurement of goods and evils, he urges them to daily examine issues of virtue 
and stresses that an unexamined life is not worth leaving (Apology 38a1-6). Someone 
who lives an unexamined life may follow his unreflective judgements and succumb to the 
power of appearance.27 
                                                 
27 We need not infer from the fact that Socrates always obeys his reflective judgement 
and thus does not fall prey to the power of appearance that Socrates believes that his true 
beliefs are stable. I suggest that Socrates thinks that it is possible that he may lose his true 
beliefs due to an argument by a superior dialectician. I base my suggestion on the fact 
that Socrates acknowledges that he holds his beliefs provisionally and that they may be 
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 Socrates’ devotion to arguments is unique. In the Apology Socrates considers it to 
lie beyond what is to be expected from an ordinary human being (ἀνθρωπίνῳ)28 since it 
requires total disregard for one’s own affairs (31a9-b5). This presumably explains why he 
believes that it would be very difficult for the Athenians to find anyone else like him if 
they killed him (30e1-5). Crito does not share Socrates’ atypical zeal for arguments. 
Since Crito has not devoted his whole life to examining arguments, he has not developed 
the epistemic virtue of having his reflective judgements trump his unreflective ones. For 
this reason, unlike Socrates, he is susceptible to the power of appearance.  
 Socrates’ critical tone against Crito indicates that Socrates believes that Crito is to 
an extent responsible for losing his true beliefs. Socrates’ critical attitude is compatible 
with his pessimism about the possibility of Crito’s resisting the power of appearance. To 
think otherwise would be a sign of confusing explanations of human actions with their 
moral justifications.29 Socrates’ theses about the intrinsic instability of beliefs and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
refuted. For example, in the Crito he is willing to examine whether there is a better 
argument in favour of his escaping from prison (46c2-3) and even give up his previous 
beliefs if they are found wanting under the current examination (46d5-7). In the Gorgias 
he claims that he assumes but does not know his beliefs to be true on the grounds that no 
one so far has refuted them (implying thus that he does not rule out that one might refute 
them in the future) (Gorgias 509a4-b1).  
28 Since Socrates is able to exhibit extreme devotion to arguments he cannot mean that it 
is beyond the reach of any human being. Cf. [reference omitted for blind review] 
29 To believe that all humans are likely to err at some point is not a reason for believing 
that when they do err they are not responsible. 
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power of appearance explain why Crito did not deliberate Socratically and formed the 
intention to help Socrates to escape. But they do not justify Crito’s urging Socrates to 
escape. Even though Socrates could not have reasonably expected from Crito to exhibit 
his own atypical zeal for arguments, he may still think that Crito could (and should) have 
done more to resist the power of appearance and follow his reflective, elenctically tested 
judgements on this occasion. After all, as Socrates points out, Crito has been well aware 
of Socrates’ arguments against trusting the moral views of the many or thinking of death 
as a great evil. Socrates’ explanatory theses about the intrinsic instability of beliefs and 
the power of appearance provide the general framework within which one should 
properly assess Crito’s moral responsibility. They do not automatically exonerate Crito. 
 To conclude, I argued that Crito’s failure to deliberate Socratically at the 
beginning of the Crito is not due to the fact that Crito does not understand Socrates’ 
values. Crito understands Socrates’ values but loses his commitment to them because he 
is overcome by the power of appearance. Given that Crito possesses ordinary cognitive 
and reasoning skills, we may reasonably take his case to exemplify a common 
predicament of the many. Like Crito, the many can understand Socrates’ values and may 
be temporarily convinced by his arguments. But since they lack either moral knowledge 
or Socrates’ atypical devotion to arguments they are unlikely to hold onto Socrates’ 
values when confronted with the difficulties of life. If my interpretation is correct then it 
paves the way for a different way of understanding Socrates’ pessimistic remark at Crito 
49d2-3 that few people will ever believe one of his central moral principles, namely, that 
one should never return injustice. I have already mentioned one possible reading of 
Socrates’ remark. Socrates may be referring to the probabilities of the many’s coming to 
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believe his principle. In that case, as I have argued, Socrates should be understood as 
regretting the fact that he has not so far been (and will not in the future be) able to argue 
long enough with many people about his principle so as to convince them. But it is 
possible that Socrates is thinking (alternatively or additionally) of the ability of the many 
to retain their belief in his principle. In that case Socrates expresses his pessimism that 
only few of those who have been convinced by his arguments may manage to hold onto 
his principle.  
